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Executive Summary
On the thirty‑ fifth anniversary of the adoption of the Orphan Drug Act
(ODA), we describe the enormous changes in the markets for therapies for
rare diseases that have emerged over recent decades. The most prominent
example is the fact that the profit‑ maximizing price of new orphan drugs
appears to be greater today than it was in 1983. All else equal, this should
reduce the threshold for research and development (R&D) investment in
an economically viable product. Further, the small size of patient popula‑
tions for orphan drugs, together with the increasing prevalence of biologics
among orphan drugs, have created a set of natural monopoly‑like markets
in which firms face little competition, even after the end of formal peri‑
ods of patent protection and market exclusivity. Additionally, the evolving
technologies of drug development—in particular, the increasingly com‑
mon use of auxiliary endpoints in clinical trials and the use of biomark‑
ers for patient selection for treatment—now allow manufacturers to tar‑
get smaller populations. Taken together, these changes raise doubts about
whether the ODA encourages the development of products that otherwise
would not have been brought to market—or whether, instead, it simply re‑
wards the producers of inframarginal products. After presenting empirical
support for our claims of an evolving marketplace, we discuss the trade‑
offs associated with reshaping the ODA for the twenty‑ first century.
I.

Introduction

Several countries, including the United States, Japan, and the members
of the European Union (EU), have adopted laws and public policies to
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encourage manufacturers to commercialize “orphan drugs” that target
exceptionally rare diseases. The United States enacted the first orphan
drug law in 1983, followed by Japan in 1993, and the EU in 2000 (see
table 1). These laws offer special incentives to manufacturers to develop
therapies for rare diseases, with rarity defined either by population size
(in the United States, an overall population of fewer than 200,000 pa‑
tients) or prevalence (for the EU, fewer than 5 in 10,000). A number of
other countries—including Australia, Korea, and Hong Kong—have
adopted similar legislation, but orphan drug laws do not exist in Africa,
South America, and most of Asia (Gammie, Lu, and Babar 2015). Many
of these countries, however, do have access to products developed in
other markets.
The justification for these orphan drug laws is that the existing re‑
search and development (R&D), regulatory, and patent systems offer
inadequate incentives for manufacturers to invest in the development
of drugs for rare diseases. The inadequacy of the incentives stems from
the fact that developing new and innovative pharmaceutical products
requires enormous up‑ front and fixed investments that do not mean‑
ingfully vary by the size of the prospective market for the drug. If any‑
thing, these costs could be larger for smaller market products, where
patient recruitment and other costs for clinical trials can be larger. These
up‑ front costs include not only financing R&D activities, but also cop‑
ing with uncertainty regarding the likelihood of success in achieving
regulatory approval and market success.
When markets are large enough, firms are willing to make such fixed
risky investments because patent systems, coupled with periods of reg‑
ulatory exclusivity, provide innovator firms with a period of monopoly
power during which they can charge prices that represent a significant
margin over manufacturing costs. Ultimately, theory predicts that firms
will continue to invest in the development of new products as long as
the expected profitability of doing so exceeds the anticipated fixed costs
associated with new product development and commercialization.
Expected profits depend on the customers’ (health insurers and
patients) willingness to pay, the volume of potential users (patients),
and the firm’s expectations about the nature of competition that will
emerge during and after the life of the product’s key patent(s). Conse‑
quently, therapies that treat a larger number of patients and/or those
that are targeted at patients with a high willingness to pay are likely
to have larger expected profits. On the other hand, therapies that treat
only a small population of individuals (e.g., drugs for rare diseases) or
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products that target patients with a low willingness to pay (e.g., prod‑
ucts for diseases that are only prevalent in the developing world, such
as malaria and other neglected tropical diseases) may not be economi‑
cally viable (Glennerster and Kremer 2000).
As a corollary, investments in R&D are predicted to stop after the
point where the marginal product of an additional dollar invested in
new product development is expected to earn risk‑ adjusted profits that
are equal to the fixed costs of R&D for that product. As such, firms are
continually evaluating both the set of factors that contribute to devel‑
opment costs and those that affect postmarket profits. Indeed, several
empirical studies find that changes to the expected profits of particular
drug markets lead to increased R&D expenditures and innovation in
those areas (Acemoglu and Linn 2004; Finkelstein 2004; Blume‑ Kohout
and Sood 2013; Dranove, Ody, and Starc 2017; Dubois et al. 2015).
Although the details of laws and policies designed to induce orphan
drug innovation differ across countries (see table 1), they typically offer
a fixed period of market exclusivity starting at the time of regulatory
approval and running concurrently with any patents. The European
Union and Japan offer ten years of exclusivity; the United States offers
seven years.1 Because patents already confer on manufacturers the ex‑
clusive right to market a given drug, the value of the exclusivity period
will depend on the strength and remaining duration of any existing
patents. For drugs with strong patents that extend beyond the seven‑ or
ten‑ year window conferred through regulatory exclusivity, the exclusiv‑
ity period is unlikely to be particularly valuable. For drugs with weak
or lapsed patents, however, orphan drug exclusivity can function as a
partial substitute for patent protection.
R&D activities related to orphan drugs also receive substantial tax
advantages under most orphan drug laws. In the United States, for
example, the 1983 Orphan Drug Act (ODA) extends a tax credit for
all R&D conducted on a drug that has secured an “orphan drug des‑
ignation” from the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). To se‑
cure a designation, a manufacturer must submit a request describing
the drug and identifying the rare disease that the drug is intended to
target.2 In 2017, the FDA granted an orphan drug designation to 476
potential products, an all‑ time high and an increase of 43% over the
previous year (Karst 2018). Once a drug is designated, the manufac‑
turer can claim tax credits amounting to 25% of any R&D associated
with the drug. (The credit was 50% for most of the history of the law,
but was reduced as part of the 2017 tax overhaul.)3 The US Treasury

1993

2000

Japan

Countries of the European Union

Source: Murakami and Narukawa (2016).

1983

United States

Country

Year
Adopted

Fewer than 5 in
10,000

Fewer than
200,000 patients in
the United States
(6 in 10,000)
Fewer than 50,000
patients in Japan
(4 in 10,000)

Threshold for
Orphan Drug
Status

10 years

10 years

7 years

Market
Exclusivity
from Date
of Approval

Table 1
Orphan Drug Legislation in the United States, Japan, and the European Union

Reimbursement
of up to 50% of
R&D costs, plus
6% tax credit
Varies across
member states

Tax credits of
25% of R&D
costs

Financial
Support
for R&D

Yes

Yes

Yes

Accelerated
Approval

17

30

40

Orphan Drugs
Approved in
2014*

87

236

496

Total Number of
Orphan Drugs
Approved
through
February 2015*
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Department estimates that $2.3 billion in orphan drug tax credits were
claimed in 2017.4
Most orphan drug laws also reduce the time and expense associated
with securing regulatory approval. Both Japan and the United States,
for example, offer “fast‑ track” approvals for orphan drugs, which
may, in turn, lead to longer periods of patent protection through faster
regulatory approval processes, given the fixed length of patents. Such
regulatory benefits also decrease the fixed cost of bringing products to
market.
Thus, existing orphan drug policies both attempt to (a) decrease the
fixed costs of therapeutic development, as well as (b) increase the potential
profits of successful products for rare diseases by extending manufactur‑
ers’ periods of monopoly pricing power. Such policies shift the thresh‑
old of profitability for orphan drugs and will therefore increase R&D
investments in some otherwise unprofitable products.
Any policy designed to improve the development of therapies for
rare diseases requires defining the set of conditions that require addi‑
tional incentives for drug development. Generally, discussions of or‑
phan drugs focus on the number of patients with a rare disease. The
ultimate concern, however, is whether the expected profitability of the
product exceeds the likely development costs. Recognizing this fact, the
ODA originally focused on economic viability, rather than solely on the
size of the patient population. The former is a focus that more directly
matches the business decisions that pharmaceutical firms face, although
the latter provides a clear and straightforward decision rule for policy
implementation.
In its original incarnation in 1983, the ODA defined a rare disease as,
“any disease or condition which occurs so infrequently in the United
States that there is no reasonable expectation that the cost of develop‑
ing and making available in the United States a drug for such disease
or condition will be recovered from sales in the United States of such
drug” (21 CFR Part 316). In addition, the ODA was written to leave
open the possibility that the definition of such settings might change
over time, specifically noting that, “determinations under the preced‑
ing sentence with respect to any drug shall be made on the basis of facts
and circumstances as of the date the request for designation under this
subsection is made.”
One year after the passage of the ODA, however, Congress revisited
the definition of a rare disease and established a patient population
threshold of 200,000. The Office of the Inspector General of the Depart‑
ment of Health and Human Services has said that “[t]he threshold was
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an arbitrary ceiling based on the estimated prevalence of narcolepsy
and multiple sclerosis” (Office of the Inspector General 2001). This
threshold remains in place today, despite a variety of changes to the
drug‑ development process, demographics, and therapeutic markets
that are likely to influence the decisions of firms regarding whether to
invest in a therapy for a rare condition. For example, the population of
the United States has increased by over 90 million individuals since the
definition’s establishment. Holding the incidence of disease and other
factors constant, this population increase has effectively decreased the
number of conditions that could qualify for an orphan designation.
Other factors, however, cut in the opposite direction, creating new
product development opportunities for niche markets.
In aggregate, the passage of the ODA has been associated with an
increase in the development of products for diseases that are known to
have patient populations below 200,000 (Yin 2008). In the decade pre‑
ceding 1983, just 10 drugs were approved to treat orphan conditions
in the United States. However, in the decade spanning 2006 to 2015,
274 orphan drugs were approved (Karst 2018). Similar increases in the
pace of approvals have been seen in the European Union and Japan,
with most of the growth driven by the development of new drugs for
rare cancers. Some of these drugs represent novel treatments; half of
all orphan drugs approved in the United States are first in their class, a
rate much higher than that seen among nonorphan drugs (Miller and
Lanthier 2016). Ivacaftor (Kalydeco), for example, offers life‑ changing
relief for those suffering from certain subtypes of cystic fibrosis, and
imiglucerase (Cerezyme) and eliglustat (Cerdelga) treat variants of
Gaucher disease, a debilitating condition that occurs when an enzyme
responsible for fat metabolism malfunctions.
But providing incentives for the development of new drugs involves
a series of trade‑ offs. Most obviously, there is a direct cost of foregone
public revenue as a result of tax credits. A second cost arises from the
regulatory exclusivity periods. This exclusivity may decrease competi‑
tion and can increase drug spending, effectively transferring surplus
from taxpayers (who finance Medicare and Medicaid) and the privately
insured to manufacturers.5 In addition, depending on the elasticity of
demand for the product, this exclusivity period can decrease welfare by
decreasing output in these markets.
The size of the second transfer and potential welfare loss effectively
depends on the nature of expected competition for the particular indi‑
cation. That, in turn, is a function of the patent status of the product.
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For example, a product lacking exclusivity but covered by at least one
strong patent would expect little competition to emerge during the pat‑
ent life. A regulatory exclusivity period overlapping with the patent
term(s) would thus result in negligible transfers. However, for drugs
that lack (strong) patents, or for drugs whose patents expire during
the ODA‑ granted exclusivity period, the additional market exclusiv‑
ity provided by the ODA has the potential to lead to relatively large
transfers.
Concretely, the share of orphan drugs with exclusivity periods that
extend beyond a drug’s patent life has been falling; a recent study
found that among orphan drugs approved from 1985 through 1994,
50% had exclusivity periods that outlasted the product being covered
by any patent, with this share falling to 35% for orphan drugs approved
from 1995 through 2004, and just 18% for orphan drugs approved be‑
tween 2005 and 2014 (Sarpatwari et al. 2018). These data are sugges‑
tive of a decrease in the average benefit of ODA‑ granted exclusivity.
However, the underlying strength of the patents covering products in
these time periods is unclear. For example, this increase in the share
of products receiving the benefits of exclusivity that are under patent
could reflect an increase in ancillary patents that offer little true protec‑
tion from competition.
Even if the relative benefits of exclusivity have declined over time,
there are still a number of criticisms related to the size of ODA‑ driven
transfers. Broadly speaking, these fall into four categories:
1. Changes in pricing dynamics have resulted in higher average prices
for drugs overall, and for orphan drugs in particular. By decreasing
the population size threshold for an economically viable product, those
dynamics have weakened the case for additional incentives targeted at
orphan drugs.
2. The small size of patient populations for orphan drugs, together with
the approval of an increasing number of complex biologics, has cre‑
ated a set of natural monopoly-like market segments in which firms face
little competition, even after the end of patent protection and market
exclusivity.
3. Changes in the technology of drug development, such as the use of aux‑
iliary or “surrogate” endpoints, and biomarkers for selecting patients
for clinical trials, have allowed pharmaceutical manufacturers to target
increasingly smaller patient populations, including subpopulations of
more common conditions.
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4. Firms increasingly seek multiple orphan drug indications for a single
product, sometimes even when that product has already been approved
for one or more nonorphan indications. In the latter case in particular,
the orphan drug laws do not serve their purpose of spurring development
of products for which there would not otherwise be a viable market.
They could, however, provide benefits by increasing knowledge about
additional novel uses for existing products or efficacy and safety for
existing uses of products.
The common thread among all of these concerns is the degree to
which the ODA currently provides incentives for the development of
products that otherwise would not have been brought to market, versus
simply rewarding the producers of inframarginal products.
Overall, firms respond to the incentives created by both the market
and policymakers. As such, if existing policy rewards inframarginal
products, profit‑ maximizing firms will claim those benefits. Similarly,
if existing policy is unable to provide adequate incentives for firms to
invest in certain products, it should not be surprising to see that such
products are not developed. In fact, well‑ crafted policy should assume
firms will act rationally, and as such, public policies should be designed
to provide incentives that recognize this aspect of firm behavior. With
such incentives, policymakers can strive to avoid the proverbial “folly
of rewarding A, while hoping for B.” We believe that the thirty‑ fifth
anniversary of the ODA’s passage and the current period of significant
technological change both mark an important time to reflect on the
ODA’s performance.
We begin by noting that the prices paid for products with orphan ap‑
provals have grown substantially since the passage of the ODA. Table 2
contains descriptive statistics for products based on their orphan status
from a major claims database (see below for a more detailed descrip‑
tion). Aggregated summary statistics are provided for the periods 1995–
2005 and 2006–2016. Like many efforts to understand pharmaceutical
pricing, the underlying data for these drugs do not provide a complete
picture of the net prices paid. But the data nonetheless point to increas‑
ing prices for orphan products and a shift in the composition of spend‑
ing on branded products toward those holding this status. For example,
from 1995 to 2005, 7.3% of brand name drug spending went toward or‑
phan drugs. For the period from 2006 to 2016, that figure rose to 20.6%.
The prevalence cutoff for defining a rare disease was first established
nearly 35 years ago, and at the time was based on the size of patient
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Orphan and Nonorphan Drugs
1995–2005
Nonorphan
Drugs

2006–2016

Orphan
Drugs

Nonorphan
Drugs

Orphan
Drugs

All Approved Brand Name Drugsa
Number of Patients
Mean
Median
Spending ($000s)
Mean
Median
Total

7,612.3
167

1,073.7
0

7,398.9
74

1,551.7
12

1,501.1
20.8
22,920,415

1,162.4
0
1,797,131

2,840.1
28.3
60,330,307

5,542.5
8.1
15,635,296

Brand Name Drugs in Contemporary Useb
Number of Patients
Mean
Median
Spending ($000s)
Mean
Median
Total

9,469.1
526

1,743.7
79.5

1,867.2
66.5
22,920,415

1,887.7
79.5
1,797,131

10,494
569
4,028.2
256.9
60,330,307

2,258.7
67
8,067.7
462.7
15,635,296

Source: OLDW Pharmacy Claims.
a
Summary statistics are calculated over drug‑ years. For example, mean nonorphan popu‑
lation size for 1995–2005 represents the average number of patients for approved nonor‑
phan drugs over that 11‑ year period.
b
Drugs in contemporary use refers to drugs with one or more claims in a given year.
We include only drug‑ years that fit this criterion in the lower panel. Population size and
spending are set to zero for drugs in years that 10 or fewer patients were treated.

populations for a subset of diseases that were believed to lack sufficient
incentives for pharmaceutical innovation. Over the past three and a half
decades, there have been a variety of technological advances in the pro‑
cess of researching and developing drugs. For example, the increasing
use of genomic and proteomic biomarkers now allows for R&D in a
larger number of potential therapeutics for small, highly targeted pa‑
tient populations (Chandra, Garthwaite, and Stern 2017).
Suggestive evidence of a change in the underlying technology and
the ability to identify new orphan populations can be seen in the quick‑
ening pace of orphan drug designations in recent years. To illustrate,
Figure 1 shows that prior to the completion of the Human Genome
Project in 2003, the number of annual orphan drug designations was
relatively constant, sitting below 100. Beginning in that year, there was
a marked increase in the number of orphan drug designations granted
by the FDA, and now there are several hundred designations granted
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Fig. 1. Orphan designations and approvals 1985–2017
Sources: Drugs@FDA and European Medicines Agency.

per year. Advances in biomarker technology have allowed for more pre‑
cise definitions of patient populations, creating more opportunities for
successful orphan drug applications (Kesselheim, Treasure, and Joffe
2017). For example, from 2009 to 2015, 16% of orphan drug approvals
were based on biomarker‑ defined subsets of diseases. To the extent that
these biomarker‑ defined products can also be more highly reimbursed,
they may represent products that could be profitably brought to market
without the additional incentives provided by the ODA.
We also examine the degree of competition that should be expected
for firms over the lifetime of the product. By delaying the onset of ge‑
neric competition, the seven years of market exclusivity for orphan
drugs is meant to provide additional profits to induce development. At
least in some drug markets, however, this protection may be redundant.
In particular, the generic market for many rare diseases is insufficiently
attractive to encourage entry from generic manufacturers. As such, may
rare‑ disease markets exhibit all the characteristics of natural monopoly
markets.
Finally, we examine the question of multiple orphan indications for
products, including products originally approved for (more) common
indications. One might criticize the granting of orphan indications for
already approved and marketed products as rewards for inframarginal
activities that may appear to conflict with the spirit of the ODA. On the
other hand, truly novel uses for existing products that target rare con‑
ditions could require meaningful investments that might not be made
without additional nonmarket incentives from the government.
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Further, with respect to the use of drugs for diseases other than their
first indication(s), physicians can prescribe FDA‑ approved drugs “off‑
label” (i.e., for indications other than those on the drug’s official label).
Therefore, if a drug is found to be efficacious for something other than
its approved indication(s), it can often be used by patients with those
other conditions. However, physicians treating patients off‑ label will
typically lack high‑ quality, FDA‑ verified clinical trial evidence docu‑
menting the drug’s efficacy in the relevant population, and payers may
be resistant to reimburse treatment (particularly for expensive drugs)
for individuals with an off‑ label condition. In the extreme, drugs that
require “preauthorization” in order to be reimbursed by payers may
not be feasible to use off‑ label. In these settings, establishing additional
indications—for both orphan and other populations—will improve
patient welfare, but this type of welfare improvement is distinct from
questions regarding a drug’s economic viability.
Taken together, accumulated data and experience provide evidence
that the market for developing treatments for rare diseases has mate‑
rially changed since the passage of the ODA 35 years ago. To further
examine these issues, we examine the expanding role of orphan drugs,
the empirical evidence for the four concerns about the efficiency of the
ODA listed above, and conclude with a discussion of the relevant policy
trade‑ offs.
II.

The Changing Pricing Dynamic for Orphan Drugs

A common belief is that without orphan drug laws, market incentives
would be inadequate to encourage drug manufacturers to develop
drugs that can only be sold to a restricted patient population. Evidence
to support this view, however, is elusive, and primarily relies on study‑
ing the emergence of new therapeutics to treat rare conditions before
and after the passage of the ODA. These data provide suggestive evi‑
dence of the ODA’s impact on drug innovation at the time of its pas‑
sage. Changing market dynamics over the past 35 years mean that even
this suggestive evidence provides little information on the causal impact
of the ODA on development incentives in today’s environment.
As noted above, firm decisions about R&D investments are driven
by the expected costs and profits of a new product. While the expected
market size for a new drug is a component of expected profits, a small
market does not necessarily imply that firms will decline to invest in
a development project. A firm may anticipate a low volume of sales
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due to a small target population, but it may still be willing to invest
if it anticipates that insurers will pay a sufficiently high price for the
units they do sell. Consider the market for cystic fibrosis therapeutics.
The overall patient population is quite small, numbering 30,000 in the
United States and 4,000 in Canada. Furthermore, as scientific knowl‑
edge of the disease has progressed, researchers have identified progres‑
sively smaller subpopulations of patients that can be treated. One or‑
phan drug, ivacaftor (Kalydeco), treats individuals with cystic fibrosis
that have G551D mutation—a group comprising just 4 to 5% of the total
cystic fibrosis population. Yet the drug’s manufacturer, Vertex, reported
$700 million in revenue from Kalydeco in 2016, and an additional $980
million for its other cystic fibrosis product, Orkambi (Vertex 2017).
The ability to charge high prices is not limited to cystic fibrosis prod‑
ucts. In the United States, the median price of an orphan drug in 2015
was nearly US$100,000 per year—almost 20 times the median price of
a nonorphan drug—and some drugs cost much more (EvaluatePharma
2015). Eculizumab (Soliris), for example, is used to treat an extremely
rare blood disease and costs about $440,000 each year. Prices for or‑
phan drugs are somewhat lower in the European Union and the rest
of the world, but are still high relative to conventional drugs (Gammie
et al. 2015). In 2014, at least eight orphan drugs had annual worldwide
sales exceeding $1 billion (Table 3); Roche reported $6.9 billion in 2014
sales of the highest‑ grossing orphan drug, rituximab (Rituxan) (Roche
Group 2014).
Even with exclusive marketing rights, manufacturers can set high
prices only because patients, governments, and private insurers have
been willing to pay them—directly (e.g., in the case of many US payers)
or indirectly (e.g., through tax subsidies). In many developed countries,
demand for orphan drugs is inelastic, meaning that it is relatively in‑
sensitive to changes in price. Five features of orphan drugs contribute
to these dynamics.
First, orphan drugs are often developed for conditions for which
there are few effective treatment options. Especially for first‑ in‑ class
drugs, payers are particularly unlikely to be unable to substitute
cheaper therapies. Relatedly, those afflicted with an orphan disease
are sympathetic and supported by well‑ organized patient advocacy
organizations, including the National Organization for Rare Disorders
in the United States (NORD) and the European Organization for Rare
Diseases (EURORDIS) in the European Union. It may, as a result, be
politically untenable or undesirable for a payer to refuse coverage for a
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promising new therapy on the grounds of cost. Both factors reduce the
price elasticity of demand and consequently may increase the markup
charged by the manufacturer.
Second, given small patient populations in equilibrium, firms will
only invest in R&D for orphan products that target patients with a rela‑
tively high willingness to pay for treatment. As a result, the ultimate
set of commercialized therapeutics is selected by business strategists
based on demographics (e.g., age) and the severity of the underlying
conditions that they target. This selection manifests itself in higher av‑
erage prices for these conditions that are not directly a function of their
orphan status.
Third, a small number of afflicted patients means that the cost of
any one orphan drug may not severely strain a health system. High
prices for relatively common drugs create two sets of externalities for
the drug market. First, they can increase the premium for insurance and
decrease purchases of that product by liquidity‑ constrained customers
(Besanko, Dranove, and Garthwaite 2016). Second, high drug prices for
more common products can attract greater regulatory scrutiny, which
might invite policy intervention (e.g., price controls) that would affect
the broader market. Both of these factors would have a greater impact
on the profitability of firms selling a portfolio of products, because they
would affect the profitability of products beyond the one with the high
price. In other words, a manufacturer that only sells one or two orphan
drugs may find it optimal to charge higher prices than a manufacturer
with one or two orphan drugs as well as a portfolio of more commonly
used drugs with higher budget impact. This fact is important given
that, as the biotech market has evolved, a large number of relatively
small firms have assumed primary responsibility for early‑ stage drug
development. Even if big manufacturers eventually purchase these
products, the purchase price (and the resulting optimal retail price) will
reflect the forgone value to the smaller firms of bringing the product to
market themselves.
Fourth, and looking forward, the advent of precision medicines al‑
lows manufactures to charge even higher prices because of the ability
to price discriminate through “indication‑ based pricing” of the type
deployed by Novartis for its new CAR‑T therapy.6 If willingness to pay
for a drug varies by the indication that it is used for (either because of
the health value created or the absence of alternative therapies), manu‑
facturers would be able to charge higher prices for these uses and lower
prices in less valued indications. That kind of price discrimination will
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Revlimid
Opdivo

Soliris

Keytruda

Rituxan
Orkambi

Imbruvica

Imbruvica

Esbriet

Tasigna

3

4

5
6

7

8

9

10

Product

1
2

Rank

nilotinib hydrochloride
monohydrate

pirfenidone

ibrutinib

ibrutinib

rituximab
lumacaftor; ivacaftor

pembrolizumab

eculizumab

lenalidomide
nivolumab

Generic Name

Table 3
Worldwide Top 20 Selling Orphan Drugs in 2020

Marketed

Marketed

Marketed
Marketed

Phase
(Current)

Novartis

Johnson &
Johnson
Roche

AbbVie

Marketed

Marketed

Marketed

Marketed

Roche
Marketed
Vertex
Marketed
Pharmaceuticals

Celgene
Bristol‑ Myers
Squibb
Alexion
Pharmaceuticals
Merck & Co.

Company

Antiprogrammed death‑ 1 (PD‑ 1)
MAb
Anti‑ CD20 MAb
Cystic fibrosis transmembrane
conductance regulator (CFTR)
corrector
Bruton’s tyrosine kinase (BTK)
inhibitor
Bruton’s tyrosine kinase (BTK)
inhibitor
Tumor necrosis factor alpha (TNFa)
and transforming growth factor‑ beta
(TGF‑β) inhibitor
BCR‑ABL tyrosine kinase inhibitor

Immunomodulator
Antiprogrammed death‑ 1 (PD‑ 1)
MAb
Anticomplement factor C5 MAb

Pharmacological Class

1,529

48

55

—

7,547
—

55

2,234

4,980
6

2014

2,331

2,492

2,712

2,982

5,117
5,051

5,297

5,414

10,058
8,192

2020

+7

+93

+91

n/a

–6
n/a

+114

+16

+12
+233

CAGR
(%)

WW Product Sales ($m)

111

Yervoy

Ofeva

Cyramza
Sprycel

17

18

19
20

ramucirumab
dasatinib

nintedanib

ipilimumab

pomalidomide
pemetrexed disodium
obinutuzumab
factor VIII (procoagulant)
carfilzomib
obeticholic acid

Celgene
Eli Lilly
Roche
Baxalta
Amgen
Intercept
Pharmaceuticals
Bristol‑ Myers
Squibb
Boehringer
Ingelheim
Eli Lilly
Bristol‑ Myers
Squibb
Marketed
Marketed

Marketed

Marketed

Marketed
Marketed
Marketed
Marketed
Marketed
Filed

Anti‑VEGF‑ 2 MAb
Tyrosine kinase inhibitor

Anticytotoxic T lymphocyte
associated protein 4 (CTLA4) MAb
Tyrosine kinase inhibitor

Immunomodulator
Thymidylate synthase inhibitor
Anti‑ CD20 MAb
Factor VIII
Proteasome inhibitor
Farnesoid X receptor (FXR) agonist

71,487
97,026

76
1,493

5

1,308

680
2,792
54
2,348
331
—

109,870
177,827

1,655
1,646

1,674

1,723

+7
+10.6

+67
+2

+164

+5

2,060 +20
2,019 –5
1,932 +82
1,918 –3
1,857 +33
1,827 n/a

Source: EvaluatePharma (2015).
Notes: Sales represent company reported sales where available, otherwise based on an average of equity analyst estimates. Worldwide sales represent
sales for all indications. All sales analysis based on EvaluatePharma’s clean “orphan” subset of products, as defined in the overview section.
a
Forecast based on a single broker model.

Other
Total

Pomalyst
Alimta
Gazyva
Advate
Kyprolis
Obeticholic acid

11
12
13
14
15
16
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require that manufactures know what indication a drug is being de‑
ployed for. While such indication‑ based pricing is not yet widely used,
the possibility of more widespread use would be facilitated by the fu‑
ture establishment and validation of genomic and proteomic biomark‑
ers for diseases (see Chandra and Garthwaite (2017) for a discussion of
indication‑ based pricing). When the Orphan Drug Act was originally
passed, virtually no such biomarkers existed, making indication‑ based
pricing infeasible. In recent years, however, knowledge about biomark‑
ers has improved rapidly. Absent the ability to practice indication‑ based
pricing, manufacturers would charge a common price that reflects the
pooled valuation of the drug across high‑ and low‑ value conditions.
But in a setting where manufacturers can charge higher prices for the
drug when used for a rare disease (either because of better effectiveness
or higher willingness to pay), it is not clear that the drug will need the
same amount of protection from competition in order to be brought to
market.7
Finally, the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)
increased the market demand for all drugs. Health insurance increases
demand for therapeutics (Baicker et al. 2013; Finkelstein et al. 2012) and
the ACA was, first and foremost, an insurance expansion. The ACA also
prohibited insurers from charging higher prices to sick patients and did
away with annual and lifetime caps on insurance benefits. These re‑
forms were particularly valuable for privately insured patients, who
needed access to high‑ cost medicines, including orphan drugs. The
ACA thus helps to fuel investment into R&D for orphan drugs by in‑
creasing demand for these therapies over the course of a patient’s life.
In summary, the combination of longer effective patents, greater price
inelasticity, the increasing use of prognostic and diagnostic disease bio‑
markers, and upticks in consumer demand will increasingly enable drug
manufacturers to aggressively price orphan drugs. Market incentives in
the absence of additional ODA‑ based provisions are thus increasingly
likely to be adequate to foster the development of many orphan drugs. To
be sure, fewer orphan drugs would be developed in the absence of special
treatment of such medicines. However, for those drugs that were devel‑
oped, competition from generics and biosimilars would arise earlier in
some cases (see above). Researchers have struggled to discern the magni‑
tude of firm response and to disentangle it from the response to changes
in market conditions (Kesselheim 2011). At a minimum, the relative im‑
portance of orphan drug laws for the extensive margin of new drug de‑
velopment has waned as the prices for orphan drugs have climbed.
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III. Data
To identify orphan drugs and their approved labeled indications, we
use data from the FDA’s online database of Orphan Drug Designations
and Approvals.8 We classify each drug with at least one orphan desig‑
nation that resulted in an approved indication as of December 31, 2017,
as an orphan drug. Then, for each orphan drug, we use data from the
Drugs@FDA database to determine all of each orphan drug’s approved
indications and the respective approval dates. This includes both or‑
phan and nonorphan indications. For example, etanercept (Enbrel) was
originally approved to treat rheumatoid arthritis, a common condition
that affects about 1.5 million people in the United States,9 but later re‑
ceived an orphan indication to treat polyarticular juvenile idiopathic ar‑
thritis, a rare form of arthritis in children. Using this data on all orphan
drug indications, we classify each orphan drug as a “pure” orphan drug
(having only orphan indications) or a “mixed” orphan drug (having
both orphan and nonorphan indications). For mixed orphan drugs,
we additionally classify each drug by approval sequence: whether the
drug’s first indication was orphan or nonorphan, or whether orphan
and nonorphan indications were simultaneously approved. This meth‑
odology allows us to broadly reproduce the summary statistics on or‑
phan drugs included in the IQVIA Institute’s (formerly IMS Institute’s)
October 2017 report on orphan drugs in the United States.10
We then create a comparison group of brand name nonorphan drugs
using data on approved drugs from Drugs@FDA, including detailed
information on brand names, active ingredients, and application num‑
bers. Because the methodology we employ to define orphan drugs
groups together multiple formulations of a drug with distinct applica‑
tion numbers (e.g., one drug approved under separate applications as
an injection and an oral tablet), we adopt a similar approach for nonor‑
phan drugs, clustering nonorphan drug formulations together accord‑
ing to their approved brand name. Then, to determine which brand
name drugs faced generic competition, we flag whether any generic
drug—as indicated by approval of an Abbreviated New Drug Applica‑
tion (ANDA)—shared an active ingredient.
To track drug spending and utilization, we employ data from the Op‑
tumLabs® Data Warehouse (henceforth OLDW). This database com‑
prises retail and mail‑ order pharmacy claims and inpatient and out‑
patient medical claims filed by beneficiaries of a large U.S. health plan
between 1993 and 2017. We restrict the data to include only claims filed
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by commercial‑ line insurance beneficiaries—omitting beneficiaries that
file claims through Medicare Part D coverage. Furthermore, we only
consider claims from beneficiaries who are enrolled in both pharmacy
and medical coverage through the health plan. For each pharmacy
claim, we calculate the total expenditure as the sum of the out‑ of‑ pocket
expenditure and the health plan expenditure. This notably does not in‑
clude expenditures by third‑ party payers nor rebates from drug manu‑
facturers to insurers. This lack of rebates is more concerning when we
discuss overall spending or relative spending across products and cat‑
egories. However, the absence of rebate data likely introduces little bias
when we examine spending across indications for the same product.
The main limitation of using claims data from any source is that, due
to billing patterns, it is difficult to isolate drug spending that occurs in
the course of inpatient or outpatient medical treatment (such as chemo‑
therapy medications), resulting in understated sales of these types of
drugs. To mitigate this issue, we capture drug spending only from retail
and mail‑ order pharmacies and then focus our drug‑ level analysis on a
few therapeutics that are both economically significant and widely dis‑
tributed in the pharmacy setting. For each of these, we track what pa‑
tients used them to treat by leveraging medical claims data to search for
diagnoses prior to a patient’s first prescription. For each of the drug’s
FDA‑ approved indications, we flag whether the patient has a diagnosis
corresponding to that indication in the year prior to its initial prescrip‑
tion. If so, we flag all of that patient’s uses of the drug as uses for that
indication. For example, if a patient is prescribed Humira on Decem‑
ber 31, 2016, and was diagnosed with Hidradentitis Suppurtiva (HS) on
January 1, 2016, then all prescriptions filled for Humira for that patient
are coded as being used to treat HS.
IV.

Orphan Drug Markets and Natural Monopolies

Because orphan markets are by nature small, they are less appealing for
entry by generic and biosimilar manufacturers after orphan exclusivity
expires. In a setting without generic or biosimilar entry, the manufac‑
turer of an orphan drug will remain a monopolist for many years—
long after relevant patents and exclusivity periods have expired. These
natural‑ monopoly‑ like conditions are most likely to emerge when the
expected economic profitability of a follow‑ on entrant is small. This
may be particularly true in the case of biologic drugs—an increasingly
large share of orphan drugs—because both the fixed costs and unit
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costs of manufacturing are higher for such products, and in other con‑
texts, biosimilar entry has been linked to the effective market size (Scott
Morton, Stern, and Stern 2018). Where competition does not emerge,
even a manufacturer that has spent billions on R&D for a drug that
treats just 10,000 patients a year will be more likely to recoup its costs
given the indefinite lifetime of the effective monopoly period in which
to do so. In such a setting, the ODA’s exclusivity period is of little value
to a manufacturer. Tax credits, however, will represent a pure transfer
from taxpayers to the manufacturer, rather than a necessary incentive to
allow a product to cross the profitability threshold. Thus, the potential
contestability of a drug market is a key to understanding whether the
ODA is necessary for inducing innovation (on the extensive margin of
whether or not a drug comes to market) versus a setting in which it re‑
flects an unnecessary transfer.
Past experience in the generics industry can help us understand
how the manufacturer of an original, branded drug may benefit from
a lack of contestability. A recent study, for example, estimates that a
drop from three to two generic manufacturers in a market is associated
with an increase in prices of as much as 37%; in many markets, there
is only one manufacturer, which could price like a monopolist if it be‑
lieves that it is not in a contestable market (Berndt, Condi, and Murphy
2017). All else being equal, smaller markets attract fewer competitors,
meaning that meaningful generic competition is unlikely to emerge to
drive down prices in those markets, unlike in larger markets. The im‑
portance of various measures of market size in predicting follow‑ on
competition has been observed in the early European experience with
biosimilars (Scott Morton, Stern, and Stern 2018). A recent report from
the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) underscores
the concern: generic drugs with a 1,000%+ price increase were in mar‑
kets that accounted for 0.03% of the overall number of generic prescrip‑
tions (HHS 2016). In those markets that accounted for 21% of overall
generic prescriptions, drug prices increased a relatively modest 1%
to 20%.
In the orphan drug space, a branded manufacturer (or in the case of
biologics, reference product manufacturer) can sometimes exploit the
link between high prices and low market contestability. Generic and
biosimilar manufacturers will recognize that their entry into a small
orphan drug market will prompt the branded manufacturer to drop its
price to maintain market share. An already small market could there‑
fore become even less profitable on a per‑ patient basis, potentially

116

Bagley, Berger, Chandra, Garthwaite, and Stern

Table 4
Average Utilization at Peak by Presence of Generic Competition
Average Number of Patients in Peak Year

Nonorphan drugs
Pure orphan drugs

Approved ANDA

No ANDA

32,069
2,316

22,542
1,035

Source: OLDW Pharmacy Claims.

eliminating the expected value of entering the market to a generic or
biosimilar manufacturer. These manufacturers may thus choose not
to enter, leaving branded manufacturers to behave as monopolists.
Crucially, the test for contestability is not the actual number of generic
manufacturers with the technical means to produce competitor drugs,
or the existing number of competitors. Instead, markets are considered
contestable based on the number of manufacturers that could rationally
enter. If that number is small—whether due to small market size or
high production costs that prevent manufacturers from achieving mini‑
mum efficient scale—the original manufacturer will remain a natural
monopolist, allowing it to reap the gains of monopoly pricing well be‑
yond the officially granted exclusivity period.
Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the reality of natural monopolies for orphan
drugs by comparing the average number of patients in a drug’s peak
year of use for orphan and nonorphan drugs. This number was slightly
greater than 1,000 patients in the data on orphan drugs where no ge‑
neric entered, and unsurprisingly, more than twice as large for orphan
markets where generics entered. This provides suggestive evidence
that generic versions of orphan drugs enter the market in situations in
which the potential market/patient population is larger. Table 5 shows
that about 50% of nonorphan drugs approved since 1984 face generic
competition. This number is just 27% for orphan drugs, and 26% for
pure orphan drugs (those that do not also have nonorphan indications).
In other words, almost three‑ quarters of orphan drugs do not face ge‑
neric competition.
These types of pricing dynamics and concerns about the limits of
competition were not as well understood in 1983 and 1984, nor were
they directly incorporated into competition policy. Indeed, the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (often referred to as
the “Hatch‑Waxman Act” after Senators Henry Waxman of California
and Orrin Hatch of Utah, who sponsored the act), which established
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Table 5
Drugs Facing Generic Competition

Nonorphan drugs
Small molecule nonorphan drugs
Orphan drugs
Pure orphan drugs
Small molecule pure orphan drugs

Drugs with
Generic
Competition

All Eligible
Drugsa

Percent with
Generic
Competition

647
647
78
54
54

1,285
1,263
286
212
165

50.4
51.2
27.3
25.5
32.7

a
Eligible drugs comprise all drugs that were approved after 1984, the year the Hatch‑
Waxman Act created the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) approval pathway
for generic drugs, and before 2011 so that each eligible drug has been approved for seven
years as of the cutoff date of December 31, 2017.

the contemporary system of generic drug regulation, did not pass until
September 1984.11
V.

Changing Technology and Producing Orphan Drugs

After taking all factors into account, many orphan drugs have the po‑
tential to cost less to develop than nonorphan drugs of the same type
(e.g., small‑ molecule drugs or biologics). There are a number of rea‑
sons for this. On average, clinical trials for orphan drugs enroll 34% as
many patients, drugs are approved about three months earlier, and
are approved at a higher rate relative to nonorphans (EvaluatePharma
2015; Thomas et al. 2016). Further, studies of neurology and oncology
drugs indicate that orphan drugs are often approved on the basis of
lower‑ quality clinical trials than conventional therapies (Mitsumoto
et al. 2009; Kesselheim, Myers, and Avorn 2011). These advantages are
strengthened by R&D tax credits to innovator firms, which further re‑
duce the costs of developing orphan medications. That said, despite
these advantages, products for very rare conditions could be quite
costly to bring to market, even with faster and cheaper (lower‑ quality)
trials, because exceptionally small target patient populations could
mean difficulties in recruiting a suitable number of patients to demon‑
strate safety and efficacy.
The cost of bringing new therapeutics, including orphan drugs,
to market may also fall with the use of “surrogate” or auxiliary end‑
points in clinical trials. Trial endpoints are simply the ex ante selected
measurements of patient outcomes in a trial. Surrogate endpoints are
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intermediate measures that can be used when the clinical outcomes of
interest may take a long time to study, or in cases where the clinical
benefit of improving the surrogate endpoint, such as controlling blood
pressure, is well understood. While ultimate clinical endpoints (such
as overall survival from cancer or AIDS) are what matters to patients,
the FDA sometimes allows surrogate endpoints (such as progression‑
free survival among cancer patients or HIV viral load in a patient’s
blood among HIV‑ positive patients) to serve as a proxy in approving
drugs, allowing clinical trials for new therapies to be completed more
quickly (FDA 2017). Surrogate endpoints typically take the form of
“biomarkers”—measurable characteristics of a patient, such as blood
pressure or tumor growth.12 The use of surrogates is likely to accelerate
with the adoption of the 21st Century Cures Act, which makes it easier
for the FDA to approve drugs based on surrogate endpoints and even
observational data. Given the profiles of rare disease and the increasing
prevalence of rare cancers among them, orphan drugs will be increas‑
ingly likely to be brought to market through clinical trials that rely on
surrogate endpoints (Stern, Alexander, and Chandra 2018).
Indeed, biomarkers may be valuable even when they cannot yet be
used as surrogate endpoints in registered clinical trials (e.g., because
the FDA has not yet “qualified” them).13 For example, biomarkers can
be used in the early phases of research to make go/no‑ go decisions
about drug development. As such, they affect the allocation of resources
through the drug‑ development cycle. In this setting, they may be espe‑
cially useful in the development of orphan drugs. To see why, consider
two types of biomarkers. Diagnostic biomarkers are “used to detect or
confirm presence of a disease or condition . . . or to identify individu‑
als with a subtype of the disease” (FDA‑ NIH 2016). These biomarkers
can determine whether a patient has a particular disease subtype for
trial eligibility. Prognostic biomarkers are “used to identify likelihood of
a clinical event, disease recurrence or progression in patients who have
the disease or medical condition of interest,” as well as “to identify in‑
dividuals who are more likely . . . to experience a favorable or unfavor‑
able effect from exposure to a medical product or an environmental
agent.”14 The use of diagnostic and prognostic biomarkers can improve
trial eligibility screening, thereby reducing the likelihood of trial failure.
To the extent that orphan diseases have a genetic component to them
(e.g., Tay‑ Sachs disease or Usher syndrome) and treatments for these
diseases are built on the basis of a better scientific understanding of
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Fig. 2. Share of clinical trials using precision medicine biomarkers
Source: Chandra, Garthwaite, and Stern (2017).

these genetic linkages, advances in biomarkers and their use in clinical
research may reduce costs associated with R&D for these diseases.15
Figure 2 highlights the growth of use of such biomarkers in US clinical
trials in recent years (see Chandra, Garthwaite, and Stern (2017) for ad‑
ditional discussion of the use of biomarkers in clinical trials).
We further note that improvements in clinical trial design, such as
Bayesian adaptive trials, coupled with the use of biomarkers for ef‑
ficient patient selection, may reduce trial sizes and durations further.
Bayesian adaptive platform trials, for example, allow investigators to
relax some of the constraints of traditional clinical trials. In traditional
trials, uncertainty about differences across disease subgroups, dosing,
treatment duration, or treatment sequencing, can lead to a failed trial.
In an adaptive trial design, differences across treatment regimens and
differences in efficacy across subpopulations of a disease can be teased
out when subpopulations are prespecified. Such trial designs are ex‑
pected to improve the overall efficiency of clinical research and new
drug approval for biomarker‑ defined subpopulations of diseases, and
may be particularly well‑ suited to identify therapeutic effects in rare
diseases with delineable orphan populations (Barker et al. 2009; Berry,
Connor, and Lewis 2015; Berry 2015). Exclusivity periods adopted in an
earlier era could not, and did not, take into account these advances in
trial design.
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·■

■ Pure Orphan

Drugs

Orphan Drugs with Non-Orphan Indications

Fig. 3. Approved orphan drugs
Source: Drugs@FDA.
Note: Only indications approved before January 1, 2018, are included.

VI.

Multiple Orphan Indications per Product

Looking past the inelastic demand for orphan drugs, the risk of natural
monopoly, and the rise of precision medicine, drug manufacturers may
also “game” features of the ODA for financial benefit. One common
complaint involves firms receiving a subsequent orphan approval for
products that are already marketed for nonorphan diseases, or mul‑
tiple orphan approvals for a single product (Tribble and Lupkin 2017).
Because securing an initial FDA approval is the most expensive compo‑
nent of new product development, the ODA’s incentives are more likely
to be “excessive” (i.e., beyond what’s necessary to ensure commercial
viability) when it comes to the approval of second, third, or fourth indi‑
cations, all else being equal. These additional indication approvals thus
present a risk of lavishing ODA incentives on a series of inframarginal
approvals.
The practice of securing orphan drug approval for old drugs is rela‑
tively common (Murphy, Puwanant, and Griggs 2012; Döring et al. 2016).
Figures 3 and 4, for example, demonstrate that, of the 489 orphan drugs
that have been approved as of year‑ end 2017, 68 (14%) of the approvals
were secured for an orphan indication after initial approval for a nonor‑
phan indication. These secondary orphan indications would be more
likely to represent “gaming” (i.e., taking advantage of the ODA’s benefits
when they are not necessary for ensuring product viability, potentially at
the expense of increased insurer and taxpayer costs) if their use for the
orphan indication was widely known—or even practiced (in the form of
off‑ label use)—in the market before the orphan approval was granted.
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Fig. 4. Number of orphan drugs by approval sequence
Source: Drugs@FDA.
Note: Only indications approved before January 1, 2018, are included.

Consider the case of amifampridine (Firdapse, also known as 3,4‑
diaminopryne [3,4‑ DAP]), which was discovered in the 1970s and has
been used for 30 years off‑label to treat two rare neuromuscular diseases—
congenital myasthenic syndromes and Lambert‑ Eaton myasthenic syn‑
drome (LEMS). Two drug companies have recently put amifampridine
through formal clinical trials for those diseases and, after securing or‑
phan drug approval in the European Union, increased the price from
$1,600 to $60,000 per year. The companies then sought approval in the
United States, prompting a group of more than 50 physicians to express
their concerns about the possibility of an “exorbitant pricing strategy”
(Burns et al. 2016). The FDA has asked for more trials on amifampri‑
dine, but if it is approved as an orphan drug, the price for a therapeutic
that has been available for decades at a relatively low cost is likely to
increase dramatically. The amifampridine case appears to represent pre‑
cisely the sort of “gaming” that the ODA’s critics deplore.
At times, however, a subsequent approval may generate valuable
evidence about a previously unknown treatment option. What might
superficially appear to be gamesmanship may, in some cases, be socially
beneficial. The economic question of interest is whether the extra stud‑
ies needed to secure an additional indication increase social value more
than the offsetting effects of higher prices and the extra government
funds that are forgone as a result of the tax credit. Net social value could
only increase through three (nonmutually exclusive) means. First, the
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requisite clinical studies might identify new uses for already approved
drugs that physicians had not yet (widely) identified through off‑ label
use. Second, the additional clinical studies might produce valuable in‑
formation on dosing and efficacy—information that may be particularly
valuable for orphan indications, where the toxicity and safety profile
may not be carefully recorded because the drugs target very sick pa‑
tients and because the conditions, by definition, are rare. Third, the new
indication could provide competitive pressure on prices for existing
products that treat the same condition. Depending on the elasticity of
demand for the drug, output and welfare could increase.
Multiple approvals are growing in importance as technological ad‑
vances allow firms to target subtypes of existing diseases and/or indica‑
tions—a practice known colloquially as “salami slicing.” Most diseases
have subtypes, and manufacturers can seek approval for a drug either for
the broader disease or for one or more known subtypes. When some of
the subtypes can be characterized as orphan diseases, the manufacturer
may seek approval for one subtype after another, garnering an additional
term of market exclusivity. As a result, a drug that is actually targeted at
a larger population can sometimes qualify as an orphan. Physicians at
Johns Hopkins University, for example, have recently documented how
variations in cancer etiology enable manufacturers to secure approval
for orphan indications. Because cancers can be characterized by organ
(breast, brain, colon) or by their associated genetic profiles (HER2, p53,
BRCA1), “almost any cancer medication can be maneuvered into an or‑
phan disease category” (Daniel et al. 2016). Imatinib mesylate (Gleevec),
for example, has received approval for seven different orphan indica‑
tions. Manufacturers can thus take advantage of well‑ characterized dis‑
ease variations in areas like oncology to extend their exclusivity period,
contributing to the high prices of orphan drugs. The practice of salami
slicing itself is not necessarily socially wasteful; rather, the value of the
practice depends on whether the clinical studies necessary to secure or‑
phan drug approval generate sufficiently valuable new information.
One suggestive test to distinguish “gaming” from socially beneficial
behavior and information generation would examine a given drug’s
use both before and after an orphan drug approval for a secondary in‑
dication. For example, consider a world where researchers had access
to complete individual‑ level data on the use of all products and the
indication for which they were used. In such a setting, an increase in
use after the approval of a new indication would suggest that the ap‑
proval process provided new information to the market. In contrast,
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no change in use would be more suggestive of behavior that had little
social benefit—in other words, may constitute gaming.16 In consider‑
ing the change in use, it is important to also examine changes in use
that may have occurred many years after the granting of the indication.
Such a delay could be the result of changes to the insurance policy, such
as prior authorization or formulary construction that could take some
time to propagate through the system.
A case study of adalimumab (Humira, from the firm AbbVie) can help
to illustrate this point, with the caveat that our claims data do not re‑
flect all patient utilization and do not explicitly tie the purchasing of
the drug with the patient’s medical indication. In 2017, Humira sales
were $18.4 billion, making it the best‑ selling drug in the United States.
The product was originally approved on December 31, 2002, for an
indication of rheumatoid arthritis—a condition affecting about 1% of
the global population, with an estimated patient population of nearly
half a million individuals in the United States (Gabriel and Michaud
2009; Helmick et al. 2008). In 2016, we estimate that 30% of sales for this
drug were for its original indication, based on a large claims database,
which we believe to be fairly representative of U.S. utilization.17 Since
its original approval, AbbVie has also sought and received approval for
five additional nonorphan indications and four orphan indications.18 If
these additional orphan indications primarily rewarded inframarginal
activity, they should have done relatively little to change use among
patients with the targeted orphan diseases. If the studies necessary to
receive the orphan indication yielded new information, however, we
would expect changes in the product’s use in those patient populations.
Figure 5, panel B, shows the percentage of overall Humira sales asso‑
ciated with patients with these orphan diseases. At the outset, we note
that the share of overall sales for orphan indications for this product is
quite low. As of 2016, despite having four orphan indications, over 90%
of sales are estimated to be for nonorphan indications of the drug.
After Humira was approved for juvenile idiopathic arthritis and pe‑
diatric Crohn’s disease—both of which are orphan indications—little
changed in overall spending on Humira for individuals with those con‑
ditions. Nor is there evidence that use patterns changed either when the
clinical trial was originally registered or when the first results were pub‑
lished. This flatline spending pattern is consistent with a “gaming” story:
though the clinical trials were successful, they contributed little new in‑
formation to the market.19 Of particular note, use does not increase even
several years after approval of the new orphan indication, suggesting that
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the pattern is not merely a function of a time lag for formulary or insur‑
ance contract redesign. What explains the lack of change? Perhaps there
was little postapproval diffusion of Humira to patients with the newly
approved orphan indication. Or perhaps Humira was already widely
used off‑ label for the approved indication. Off‑ label use may have been
especially prevalent for pediatric Crohn’s disease, for example, because
Humira obtained approval for adult Crohn’s in 2007. That’s common:
some orphan designations are granted for indications in small pediatric
populations, even though the drug is already approved for adults and
physicians may be prescribing the drug for kids. In either case, it suggests
the orphan approval yielded at most only a slight social benefit.
In contrast, consider AbbVie’s effort to secure orphan drug approval
for Humira to treat Hidradenitis Suppurativa (HS). In the year prior,
Humira spending on HS totaled only $1.75 million in the data. Imme‑
diately after the granting of orphan approval, however, there was a
marked increase in the percentage of spending on Humira for individu‑
als with this condition. In the year after receiving the orphan indication,
Humira spending from patients with HS increased from approximately
1% to 3.5% of sales, with over $10 million in total sales in the data.
The total percentage of Humira spending on orphan indications also
rose swiftly after the drug’s approval for HS. Because the R&D efforts
supporting this orphan indication are associated with a sharp uptick
in the use of the product, it likely represents an increase in patient wel‑
fare. That increase may or may not be large enough to justify the costs
of ODA incentives. It is possible AbbVie might have sought approval
for HS even without the promise of market exclusivity or tax credits.
Regardless, the pattern of Humira’s use for HS suggests that not all
repeated orphan drug approvals reflect pure gamesmanship.
VII.

Off-Label Prescribing of Orphan Drugs

A second type of gaming can occur if manufacturers seek orphan drug
approval for a narrow indication in the expectation (a) that the drug
will be extensively prescribed off‑ label for other, more common dis‑
eases, and/or (b) that the manufacturer will later apply for a broader,
nonorphan indication. It may be easier to obtain drug approval for a
product with an orphan indication than a nonorphan indication: an ex‑
pedited approval pathway is available for drugs to treat unmet needs,
clinical trials into orphan drugs are shorter and cheaper, and the clini‑
cal benefits for a targeted population may be easier to discern, as noted
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Fig. 6. Spending on orphan indications for Humira by indication
Source: OLDW Pharmacy Claims.
Note: Each orphan indication is marked in the year of approval. Spending for each indi‑
cation is reported as zero in years where ten or fewer persons were identified with the
particular indication.

above. At the same time, however, the nonorphan uses of an orphan
drug may be significant, suggesting that the drug would have come to
market in the absence of ODA’s incentives. A 2012 study concluded that
the use of orphan drugs for nonorphan conditions is relatively common
(Kesselheim et al. 2012). The lidocaine patch, for example, was origi‑
nally approved to treat an orphan condition—painful hypersensitivity
and chronic pain in postherpetic neuralgia—but has been prescribed
for different uses 82.3% of the time.
The degree to which the initial approval for an orphan indication rep‑
resents socially inefficient gaming partly depends on the manufacturer’s
expected returns from pursuing the initial orphan indication. If the man‑
ufacturer anticipates that the drug will be widely prescribed off‑ label
for a nonorphan indication, orphan drug approval becomes a vehicle
for expediting regulatory approval and/or reaping tax and exclusivity
benefits, all while selling the drug to a much larger patient population.
Orphan drug incentives could thus be misdirected to nonorphan thera‑
peutics. In addition, firms may deliberately exploit the lower approval
threshold for orphan products. Although the FDA may be comfortable
allowing a potentially less safe product onto the market because it tar‑
gets a small population of patients without other good treatment op‑
tions, that evidence threshold may represent an unacceptable trade‑ off
for a product that is expected to come into widespread use or may be
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used for diseases with other established, better‑ understood therapies.20
The risk of this sort of gamesmanship has likely increased over the past
decade as the courts, drawing on the First Amendment, have main‑
tained that drug manufacturers can share scientific research about off‑
label uses without running afoul of the federal prohibition on off‑ label
marketing (Daniels et al. 2016).
In some cases, however, the possibility that an orphan drug might
be prescribed off‑ label will not factor into a manufacturer’s expected
returns. If a drug’s off‑ label use is serendipitously discovered, a drug
manufacturer will not have “gamed” the ODA in seeking the initial or‑
phan drug approval, even if the subsequent off‑ label use turns out to be
extensive. In such a case, however, the profits associated with the off‑
label use represent a pure windfall: because they were not factored in
to the initial investment decision, they have no direct incentive effects.
The identification of gamesmanship thus turns on a manufacturer’s
subjective expectations at the time of the initial investment. Without
access to a firm’s internal deliberations and confidential strategic dis‑
cussions, regulators are unable to ascertain ex ante whether a drug is
intended strictly for an orphan population or is expected/hoped to be
sold more broadly. In many cases, the truth may lie somewhere along
a spectrum. The difficulty of identifying gamesmanship ex ante, how‑
ever, suggests the potential appeal of an ex post regulatory approach,
in which the government recoups the monetary value of the ODA’s fi‑
nancial incentives once a drug is sold either on‑ or off‑ label to a patient

128

Bagley, Berger, Chandra, Garthwaite, and Stern

population that exceeds the orphan drug threshold. Ex post recoup‑
ment would reduce ex ante incentives to deliberately game the system
without discouraging investment in drugs that are expected to be sold
only to those afflicted with rare diseases, and while maintaining a fair
approach for drugs that turn out, ex post, to be widely used.
VIII.

Access to Orphan Products

The underlying impetus behind the ODA was a concern that individu‑
als suffering from rare conditions would be left without treatment op‑
tions. However, in recent years an additional concern has emerged: that
the high prices of orphan drugs can lead to situations where the exis‑
tence of products does not guarantee patient access. This concern was
best expressed by Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar
who said “There’s little difference for a sick patient between a miracle
cure that hasn’t been discovered and one that is too expensive to use.”21
While this concern about pricing and access is fair, it is crucial to
recognize that even a “first‑ best” orphan drug policy that targets only
those products that otherwise would not be brought to market would
likely have little impact on prices. Many of these products would still be
patented, and the demand for the drugs would still remain strong and
inelastic among their target populations. This is likely to become even
more true as some treatments for extremely rare monogenic diseases
like cystic fibrosis, Tay‑ Sachs disease, beta thalassemia, and Duchenne
muscular dystrophy start to resemble “cures,” as a result of advances
in new drugs—including cell and gene therapies. Instead, focusing the
benefits of the ODA on truly marginal products would likely decrease
the number of products that receive orphan drug benefits. This may
lower prices for the inframarginal products that currently receive ODA
protection, and could open up the possibility of earlier generic competi‑
tion in a contestable market.
If policymakers are concerned about the high prices of orphan drugs,
either in addition to or simply instead of the existence of these prod‑
ucts, payers must be given the freedom to more carefully consider the
value of the drugs that they purchase. Almost by definition, orphan
drugs represent the only product in a therapeutic category and thus are
likely to be included on a formulary even if they provide relatively little
value. Forcing such a drug into a bundle with a large number of other
value‑ creating products can allow manufacturers to charge high prices,
sometimes prices that exceed the value of the product (Besanko et al.
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2016). Where an orphan drug is not cost effective—when it yields only
incremental health improvements but has an enormous price tag—
lower prices will only come if payers are empowered to say “no.” Some
governments have taken steps in that direction. Sweden, for example,
has declined to pay for about half of newly approved orphan drugs
(Garau and Mestre‑ Ferrandiz 2009). If a critical mass of developed na‑
tions followed Sweden’s lead, drug manufacturers would come under
considerable pressure to cut their prices or to focus on the commercial‑
ization of higher‑ value therapeutics.
IX.

Discussion

An efficient policy would target incentives toward those firms and prod‑
ucts that create meaningful improvements for small patient populations
and are not otherwise economically viable investments. In developing
such regulations, policymakers must confront three broad questions:
(1) which products should receive assistance, (2) whether all products
should receive the same benefit, and (3) what incentives the government
should provide to firms developing those products. We will discuss the
economics underlying each of these decisions in turn.
We first consider the question of which products should receive as‑
sistance. As discussed above, a “first‑ best” orphan policy would target
only those products that otherwise would not be brought to market. For
many reasons, this is quite hard to ascertain ex ante, and as a result, it
appears that many firms currently receive economic benefits for invest‑
ing in inframarginal products that would otherwise be developed.
This situation is a function, in part, of the inherent inflexibility of ty‑
ing orphan drug approval to a fixed threshold of disease prevalence. By
definition, any fixed threshold cannot adjust to changing market condi‑
tions. As markets evolve—whether due to changing costs of product
development or the potential revenues from a successful investment—
the optimal threshold associated with economic viability will shift. If
development costs fall and revenues increase, for example, an increas‑
ing share of (now) inframarginal products will be eligible for ODA
benefits. The evidence suggests this has already occurred: prices have
increased steadily and dramatically for orphan drugs over the past 35
years, with no countervailing change in the prevalence threshold. And
the evidence suggests it will continue occurring in particular sectors of
the pharmaceutical market, where the increased use of biomarkers is
both decreasing the costs of some clinical trials (Chandra, Garthwaite,
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and Stern 2017) and may enable more effective (and more lucrative)
indication‑ based pricing (Chandra and Garthwaite 2017).
Related to the question of which products should receive benefits is
a question of whether all products receiving orphan approvals should
receive the same benefits. The current ODA provides a single benefit
structure enjoyed by all firms successfully receiving a designation and
subsequent approval, regardless of the underlying economics of the
product’s potential market. This creates a problem similar to providing
incentives to inframarginal products. A uniform benefit means that, by
definition, some products that are actually marginal (in that they would
not be brought to market without some level of assistance) still receive
benefits that exceed what would be required to incentivize the firm to
invest in the product. In addition, products requiring larger amounts
of assistance in order to be economically viable may never be brought
to market.
The ODA’s uniform benefit structure implies that it will often confer
excessive benefits when firms seek orphan approvals for additional in‑
dications for existing products, particularly when those products lack
patent protections and are in widespread use. For these indications,
early‑ stage trials have already demonstrated safety, and thus develop‑
ment costs are likely to be much lower than for a totally new prod‑
uct. Similarly, benefits may be excessive for those firms that anticipate
a large volume of off‑ label sales for a drug that comes to market as
an orphan. That is particularly true given that the lower threshold for
clinical trials for orphan products likely results in lower development
costs for these products. On the other side of the ledger, firms receive
fixed benefits whether or not a drug candidate is likely to face meaning‑
ful generic competition. For products in markets where manufacturers
expect little generic competition (i.e., those that more closely resemble
natural monopolies), market exclusivity offers little value and therefore
provides few additional incentives for commercialization. In this situa‑
tion, market exclusivity cannot correct a perceived investment shortfall
in orphan drugs.
Both the concerns about rewarding inframarginal products and pro‑
viding an inappropriate level of assistance to marginal products could
be addressed if the fixed, numerical prevalence threshold were aban‑
doned. The ODA could be amended to return it to its original form,
one that referenced explicitly the economic viability of a product that
is developed to treat a disease afflicting a small patient population.
Policymakers could then target incentives to novel drugs or to novel
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uses for existing drugs. In many instances, for example, firms receive
the benefits of the ODA for a new indication for a product that is al‑
ready widely available. As the Humira case study suggests, new in‑
dications can sometimes create value in the form of increased use. In
other cases, however, new indications appear to simply codify an exist‑
ing off‑ label use, which provides fewer welfare benefits. Depending
on whether a new indication demonstrates a genuinely novel use for
an existing drug, orphan drug approval will have different effects on
welfare and will likely present a different value proposition for firms.
An ideal policy would acknowledge those differences and adjust incen‑
tives accordingly.
Shifting to a standard of economic viability, however, is easier said
than done. At a minimum, identifying drug candidates that truly need
additional R&D support would require providing regulators with new
legal authority. In addition, regulators would require meaningful new
resources and expertise to adequately shoulder these new responsi‑
bilities. For example, understanding the potential value of a new use
might require regulators to systematically monitor off‑ label use of exist‑
ing products. They might also need to employ sophisticated economic
models, supplemented with data from private insurers, to estimate a
drug’s expected market value and determine whether manufacturers
are likely to require additional incentives for particular classes of drugs.
These potential costs highlight the appeal of a bright‑ line rule to
qualify for orphan drug status. Such a rule is intrinsically easy to un‑
derstand and administer. The appeal of extending uniform benefits to
all drugs with an orphan drug approval follows similar logic: it yields
certainty for manufacturers and regulators alike. In both cases, simplic‑
ity reduces decision costs and mitigates certain risks of gamesmanship
and regulatory capture. Significantly, too, FDA regulators currently lack
the resources and the information necessary to evaluate the financial
viability of drug candidates and the social value associated with their
approval ex ante. An easy‑ to‑ administer rule relieves the agency of that
responsibility.
It is not clear, however, that the benefits associated with a rule‑ bound
approach outweigh its costs—especially as the costs of that rule‑ bound
approach increase over time. It certainly is unlikely that any implicit
calculations supporting the policy choices made in 1984 remain valid in
the pharmaceutical market that has emerged over subsequent decades.
In addition, we should note that the tools for estimating the financial
viability of potential new therapies do exist and the FDA could employ
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them to better target incentives for drug development. While imple‑
mentation difficulties should be considered, they should not stand as
an insurmountable obstacle to more efficient policy.
Setting aside which drugs should receive incentives, policymakers
should also consider the nature of those incentives. Currently, the ODA
provides two types of incentives: a period of market exclusivity and
an R&D tax credit. Both are intended to increase the expected profits
of an investment in drug development by both lowering the costs and
increasing the revenues associated with the commercialization process.
The funding sources of these two incentives are distinct, however, and
their economic impacts differ meaningfully.
The tax credit is funded from general tax revenue and therefore has a
relatively broad base of financial support. Thus, inefficiency arises from
the general deadweight loss of raising government funds and the op‑
portunity cost of how those funds could be otherwise spent. In contrast,
the period of market exclusivity results in a protracted period of higher
drug prices. In a world with no cost sharing, those prices would spur
higher insurance premiums across the entire risk pool. Higher premi‑
ums would in turn distort the purchase decision for insurance; the re‑
sulting welfare losses would fall most acutely on the privately insured.
Those cost burdens are compounded to the extent that insurers employ
differential cost sharing for orphan and other specialty products. In
that case, the benefits of orphan products would be financed, in part,
through an effective tax on individuals with orphan conditions. That
tax partly unwinds the insurance product for those individuals, result‑
ing in an inefficiently low consumption of drugs and an inadequate
level of risk protection.
These differential funding sources imply that in some cases tax cred‑
its may be a superior incentive mechanism relative to extended market
exclusivity. The case for tax credits becomes stronger because they can
be clawed back by regulators in the event that the product is more suc‑
cessful than expected at the time of its orphan drug application. Exclu‑
sivity periods can also be terminated—EU law, for example, allows a
reduction of the exclusivity period to six years when a drug is deemed
sufficiently profitable, though that authority has not been exercised. Ter‑
minating an exclusivity period, however, may not immediately induce
competition, even in rivalrous markets. Generic manufacturers may be
uncertain about the date that the exclusivity period will lapse, increas‑
ing the uncertainty associated with the development of a competitor
product. If generics’ ability to time entry into the market is compro‑
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mised, manufacturers could maintain de facto exclusivity for some pe‑
riod after the de jure period ends—a feature that speaks for the ongo‑
ing attractiveness of gaming, even in a world where exclusivity can be
revoked.
Terminating tax credits, in contrast, would not have a similar ef‑
fect on market dynamics. Under a system where firms were required
to document economic viability, a modified ODA could empower the
government to automatically claw back the value of the credit if and
when a firm’s revenues exceed those documented in the orphan drug
application. Only windfall profits would be recouped, which (properly
administered) should not affect a firm’s ex ante investment choices. In
addition, such a system has already been shown to be administrable: in
Japan, for example, manufacturers must repay R&D subsidies for drugs
with annual sales that exceed 100 million yen (Wellman‑ Labadie and
Zhou 2010). Tax credits are not panaceas: firms may be able to game
such a tax credit by allocating fixed costs that were not truly related to
the development of an orphan product. They do, however, have distinct
advantages over fixed periods of market exclusivity.
Regardless, meaningfully changing ODA incentives would be espe‑
cially attractive if the definition of an orphan drug shifted away from
disease prevalence and toward financial viability. If eligibility for or‑
phan drug status or the size of R&D incentives hinged on an ex ante as‑
sessment of economic viability, firms would, at the margin, be tempted
to game the system, either by overstating costs or understating poten‑
tial revenues. Because regulators would have a difficult time preventing
such gamesmanship, terminating incentives once a manufacturer has
recouped its risk‑ adjusted R&D investment might be a more construc‑
tive approach.
Ultimately, adapting the ODA to the twenty‑ first century will de‑
mand a careful evaluation of a complex set of questions. Which prod‑
ucts should be targeted? What incentives should be provided? What
regulatory resources can be mustered? In an ideal world, affording
greater flexibility to regulators could allay many of the economic con‑
cerns associated with the current regime. In a non‑ ideal world, how‑
ever, it is an open question whether regulators have (or will be given)
the capacity, legal authority, and resources to develop and fairly admin‑
ister a better‑ calibrated orphan drug policy. At a minimum, policy ap‑
proaches that allow the government to direct incentives to the develop‑
ment of orphan drugs that would otherwise not be economically viable
hold substantial promise.
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Endnotes
This paper was prepared for the 2018 NBER Innovation Policy and the Economy con‑
ference. We are grateful to Scott Stern and Kyle Myers for helpful comments. Chandra is
an OptumLabs Visiting Fellow. For acknowledgments, sources of research support, and
disclosure of the authors’ material financial relationships, if any, please see http://www
.nber.org/chapters/c14097.ack.
1. In the United States, every new chemical entity approved by the FDA receives
five years of market exclusivity. A new chemical entity that is approved as an orphan
product, however, also receives a seven‑ year period of orphan drug exclusivity, which
runs concurrently with (and thus extends two years beyond) the five years of exclu‑
sivity for new chemical entities. A previously approved product can receive multiple
orphan indications, with a separate seven years of regulatory exclusivity for each new
indication.
2. See 21 C.F.R. §§316.20 & 316.21. A manufacturer can also seek an orphan designation
for conditions that target more than 200,000 patients, but only if it demonstrates that “no
reasonable expectation that costs of research and development of the drug for the disease
or condition can be recovered by sales of the drug in the U.S.”
3. Pub. L. No. 115‑ 97, 13401(a).
4. Report on Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Year 2019. https://www.treasury.gov/resource
‑center/tax ‑policy/Documents/Tax ‑Expenditures ‑FY2019.pdf.
5. The general equilibrium welfare implications of this are unclear, as the existence of
market exclusivity increases the availability of products.
6. Chimeric antigen receptor, or CAR T‑ cell therapy, is a relatively new form of im‑
munotherapy that uses specially altered T cells to more specifically target cancer cells
(http://www.dana ‑farber.org/cellular ‑therapies ‑program/car ‑t ‑cell ‑therapy/).
7. This discussion may make it seem as if biomarkers increase the ability to price dis‑
criminate only where a drug has both orphan and nonorphan uses. But even for drugs
with solely orphan applications, a biomarker that better predicts benefit (e.g., by identi‑
fying a particularly rare genetic defect) will facilitate the drug being deployed in those
patients with the greatest benefit; this, in turn, increases the price that can be charged.
8. https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/opdlisting/oopd/index.cfm.
9. https://www.arthritis.org/about ‑arthritis/types/rheumatoid ‑arthritis/what ‑is
‑rheumatoid ‑arthritis.php.
10. This report is available at: https://www.iqvia.com/institute/reports/orphan‑drugs
‑in ‑the ‑united ‑states.
11. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98–417, 21
U.S.C. § 355(j) (1984).
12. The FDA’s Biomarkers, EndpointS and other Tools (BEST) glossary defines a bio‑
marker as a defined characteristic that is measured as an indicator of normal biological
processes, pathogenic processes, or responses to an exposure or intervention, including
therapeutic interventions (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK326791).
13. https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/DrugDevelopment
ToolsQualificationProgram/BiomarkerQualificationProgram/default.htm.
14. The two categories overlap to some extent: for example, certain cystic fibrosis
transmembrane conductance regulator mutations can be used as both diagnostic and
predictive biomarkers to select patients for therapies or clinical trials.
15. However, other costs associated with clinical research, such as patient recruitment,
may go up in this setting.
16. For completeness, it is important to note that this would also be consistent with a
simple error by a firm that expected an increase in utilization from the new indication,
but was wrong. It would also be consistent with limited or absent coverage by payers for
a new orphan drug—even “on‑ label.”
17. While we lack complete insight into the rebate structure, this is a smaller concern
when examining the distribution of expenditures across indications within a product be‑
cause rebates are not currently tied to particular indications.
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18. Humira approval history (orphan indications in bold):
Date
12/31/02
10/3/05
7/28/06
2/27/07
1/18/08

Indication

Date

Indication

Rheumatoid arthritis
Psoriatic arthritis
Ankylosing spondylitis
Adult Crohn’s disease
Plaque psoriasis

2/21/08
9/28/12
9/23/14
9/9/15
6/30/16

Juvenile idiopathic arthritis
Ulcerative colitis
Pediatric Crohn’s disease
Hidradentitis Suppurtiva (HS)
Uveitis

19. As noted above, this conclusion requires that the drug has broad coverage among
patients (e.g., without requiring preauthorization).
20. This source of inefficiency should not be confused with applying “orphan drug”
prices to a broader population. To the extent that the manufacturer is a rational profit‑
maximizing firm, it will set a price that would cause a payer to allow the broader population
access to the product. This is particularly true given that a payer can relatively easily imple‑
ment utilization management techniques to limit access to a product for off‑ label indications.
21. http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/385805 ‑hhs ‑secretary ‑trump ‑drug ‑pricing
‑plan ‑will ‑go ‑much ‑further ‑than ‑budget.
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